Price Stability and Development in Mainland China (1951-63) by Perkins, Dwight Heald
 
Price Stability and Development in Mainland China (1951-63)
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Perkins, Dwight Heald. 1964. Price stability and development in
mainland China (1951-63). Journal of Political Economy 72(4):
360-375.
Published Version doi:10.1086/258916
Accessed February 18, 2015 4:41:51 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3429712
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAPrice Stability and Development in Mainland China (1951-63)
Author(s): Dwight H. Perkins
Source: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Aug., 1964), pp. 360-375
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1828392
Accessed: 04/12/2009 15:34
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Political Economy.
http://www.jstor.orgPRICE  STABILITY  AND  DEVELOPMENT  IN 
MAINLAND  CHINA  (1951-63)1 
DWIGHT H.  PERKINS 
Harvard University 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
C  ONTROLLING inflation  in any un- 
derdeveloped  economy where the 
emphasis  is  on  rapid  economic 
growth  is  never  easy.  Policies  for  con- 
trolling price increases almost  invariably 
affect a country's  rate of growth-a  fact 
no less true for Mainland  China than for 
any  other  developing  country.  The  par- 
ticular  interest  of  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist  experience  arises  from  the  high 
degree  of  direct  control  exercised  over 
most  aspects  of  the  Chinese  economy. 
This  high  degree  of  control  has  often 
forced the regime to face the relationship 
between  inflation  and  growth  in  areas 
where the connection  between  the two is 
commonly  ignored. 
Until  1958 or 1959 the  Communists  in 
China had managed  not  only  to  achieve 
a high rate of growth,  but  to keep  price 
increases  at  a moderate  level.  They  ac- 
complished  this in the face of a develop- 
ment  strategy  that  gave  overwhelming 
priority  to  the  industrial  producers' 
goods sector and a technique  of planning 
that  relied on  overfull  utilization  of  re- 
sources.  In  addition,  during  the  first 
three  years  of  the  regime's  existence, 
China  was  involved  in  a  major  war  ef- 
fort.  Under  similar,  but  probably  less 
severe,  handicaps  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1 This research was carried out at Harvard Uni- 
versity  and in Hong  Kong  under a grant from the 
Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowship 
program.  The  author's  principal  debts  for  advice 
and criticism are to Professors Abram Bergson and 
Simon Kuznets. 
the  1930's had found it necessary to allow 
a substantial  inflation  in prices. 
This paper attempts  to deal first with 
the  question  whether  the  absence  of in- 
creases  in  the  official  price  indexes  is 
meaningful,  or simply  the  result  of  sta- 
tistical  inadequacies  or  the  arbitrary 
freezing  of  prices  combined  with  exten- 
sive  rationing  and  black  markets.  Sec- 
ond,  I  discuss  the  extent  to  which  this 
stability  has  been  achieved  by  direct 
controls  over  the  flows  of  purchasing 
power onto the consumers' goods market 
and  analyze  the  methods  used  to  close 
the  inflationary  gap  where  such  direct 
controls  have  proved  inadequate.  Final- 
ly'  I attempt  to appraise whether,  given 
the goals of the Chinese Communists,  the 
selection  of  alternative  anti-inflationary 
measures has been  made in the  most  ef- 
ficient  manner. 
The  main focus is on retail prices and 
the  consumers'  goods  market  because 
this was where the regime's major efforts 
were  directed.  The  Soviet  system  in in- 
dustry,  of centrally planning and allocat- 
ing  most  important  raw  materials  and 
producers'  goods,  was  initially  taken 
over almost  in toto by  the  Chinese Com- 
munists.  It  made  the  freezing  of whole- 
sale prices both easy and, from the point 
of view  of  simplifying  the  task  of plan- 
ning,  desirable.  Retail  prices,  however, 
could not be held down for any length  of 
time  without  concurrent  control  of  the 
sources of purchasing power entering the 
consumers'  goods  market,  or  the  result 
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would have been widespread rationing,  a 
black  market,  or both. 
II.  EXTENT  OF INFLATION  SINCE  1951 
AND  ITS  SIGNIFICANCE 
The  major  sources  of  information  on 
price increases are the official retail price 
indexes  published  by  the  Communists. 
These  show  an  average  annual  rate  of 
increase since  19512 of barely  1 per cent 
with  the largest rises being only  3 and 2 
per cent  in  1953 and  1957, respectively 
(see Table  1). Although  the last  date for 
TABLE  1 
PRICE  INDEXES  OF CONSUMERS'  GOODS IN  CHINA 
(1952 =  100) 
All-China  Price  Index  Retail  Prices 
Year  Retail  Rural  Retail  of  Industrial  in  Eight 
Price  Index  I  Price  Index  Products  in 
Large  Cities  Price  Index 
~~Rural  Areas  LreCte 
1951  ...........  100.1  .............  100.5  101.0 
1952  ...........  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1953  ...........  103.2  100.9  98.5  104.9 
1954  ...........  105.5  104.5  100.2  106.9 
1955  ...........  106.3  105.7  101.4  107.9 
1956  ...........  106.3  105.3  100.4  107.8 
1957  ...........  108.6  107.7  101.6  109.1 
1958*  ......  .  108.3  107.1  101.0  108.2 
* First  half  of year. 
Sources:  State  Statistical  Bureau,  Ten Great Years, pp.  172-74,  and  Hong  Kong,  Wen Hui  Pao, 
June  1, 1958. 
which  official  price  indexes  were  pub- 
lished was June,  1959, refugee and other 
firsthand  evidence  indicates  that  official 
prices have not risen significantly through 
1962 and perhaps  1963.3 
These  indexes,  however,  do  not  com- 
pletely  reflect the true extent  of price in- 
creases during the periods  of greatest  in- 
flationary  pressure,  1953,  1956,  and 
1960-62.  This  was a result of the inabil- 
2 The  year  1951 was  the  first in which  one can 
safely state that the hyperinflation of the  1940's had 
been brought completely under control. 
3 A number of official prices were raised in 1963, 
but  not  enough  data  are  available  to  ascertain 
whether  these  increases had  a significant  effect  on 
the indexes. 
ity  of the regime to collect  adequate  na- 
tionwide  price  data  for  any  but  a  few 
dozen major consumer items-commodi- 
ties that were either formally rationed or 
at least  had their prices held below what 
they  would  have  been  on  a  completely 
free  market.  The  remaining  commodi- 
ties,  the ones that  were not generally  in- 
cluded  in the indexes,  not  only  were not 
subject  to  such  rigid  price  control,  but 
had,  in  addition,  to  soak  up  the  excess 
purchasing  power  that  normally  would 
have  been soaked up by  the major com- 
modities.  These  excluded  commodities 
made up approximately  30 per cent of all 
retail sales4 and were sold mostly  on the 
free markets. 
Evidence  to  support  the  belief  that 
official  price  indexes  tended  to  have  a 
downward bias can be found for all three 
periods during which there were particu- 
larly  severe  inflationary  pressures.  For 
example,  in  1953  the  official  prices  of 
grain and cotton  cloth  hardly rose at all 
(the cotton-cloth  price actually  fell),  but 
4 T'ung-chi  Kung-tso  T'ung-hsun  ("Statistical 
Work Bulletin")  data  office, "The  1956 Domestic 
Market  Price  Situation,"  Hsin-hua  Pan-yueh-k'an, 
No.  10 (May  25, 1957), p.  115. 362  DWIGHT  H.  PERKINS 
some  grain  was  being  sold  on  the  free 
market  at  20--30  per  cent  above  the 
official  price.  Urban  vegetable  prices 
(many of which did not  enter the official 
indexes)  were  about  30  per  cent  above 
their  1952 level.  In  the  second  half  of 
1957, vegetable  prices in the eight largest 
cities  had  risen  by  17.9  per  cent  over 
what  they  had  been  in  the  first  half  of 
1956.5 This was a rise which might  of it- 
self have caused  an additional  1 per cent 
increase  in  the  retail  price  index,  if  all, 
instead of just a few, vegetable  prices had 
not  been  excluded  from  the  official  in- 
dexes.6  Finally,  refugee  evidence  indi- 
cates  that  between  1960 and  1962 free- 
and black-market  prices (it was not easy 
to  distinguish  between  free  and  black 
markets  at  this  time)  were  many  times 
the  official  prices.7  Under  the  assump- 
tion  that  all  the  non-included  prices 
fluctuated  as  much  as  vegetable  prices, 
the bias in the official indexes would be 9 
per cent  in  1953 and 5 per cent  in  1957 
and considerably  more in 1960-62.  Vege- 
table  prices,  however,  tended  to  be 
erratic  for  reasons  only  partly  connect- 
ed  with  general  inflationary  pressures, 
so  that  this  is  probably  an  extreme  as- 
sumption.  It  is more likely  that  the bias 
was  seldom  more  than  3  or  4  per  cent 
except  perhaps  during  1960-62.  During 
periods  of  retrenchment,  such  as  1954 
and  1957, the  official indexes  may  even 
5These  price  data  are  taken  from  Young  Po, 
"Planned  Purchase  and  Planned  Supply  and  the 
National  Construction  of  Socialism,"  Ching-chi 
Yen-chiu, No.  1 (February, 1956), p. 38; and Peking 
Ta Kung Pao,  September 24, 1957. 
6 Vegetables  made up  approximately  7 per cent 
of the total expenditure of the average urban worker. 
This estimate is derived from data in "On the Ques- 
tion  of  Industrial  and  Agricultural  Standards  of 
Living," T'ung-chi Kung-tso, No.  13 (July 14, 1957), 
p. 4; and Peking  Ta Kung Pao, September 24, 1957. 
7 This is based on refugee interviews  conducted 
by the author and others in Hong  Kong in 1961 and 
1962. 
have  overstated  the  rise because  official 
prices  tended  to  be  as  inflexible  down- 
ward as up. The combination  of retrench- 
ment and better harvests  has also caused 
free-market  prices  in  1963  to  fall  from 
their  crisis  levels,  although  not  yet  all 
the  way  back  to  the  official  prices  at 
which  the  same  goods  could  be  bought 
with  ration  coupons.8  None  of  these 
qualifications,  therefore,  negates  the 
basic  contention  that  price  increases  in 
Communist  China  have,  in  fact,  been 
quite  modest. 
One may  question  whether  these  rela- 
tively  modest  price  increases,  including 
those  increases on the  free market,  ade- 
quately  reflect the  extent  of inflationary 
pressure  on  China's  consumers'  goods 
market.  Certainly  rationing  was  wide- 
spread  and  became  progressively  more 
so.  Formal  rationing  of  a sort  began  as 
early as November,  1953, in conjunction 
with  the  introduction  of  compulsory 
farm delivery quotas. It gradually spread 
to  the  urban  areas  and  an  increasing 
number of commodities.  In addition, dur- 
ing periods of tight supply there has been 
considerable  queuing  up  to  purchase 
commodities  not  subject  to  formal  ra- 
tioning.  Even  taking  the  existence  of 
widespread  rationing  into  account,  how- 
ever, one can still support the contention 
that  the  unfilled  inflationary  gap  was 
relatively  small.  With  the  exception  of 
short  periods  during  1955-56  and  1958- 
59,  a  free  market  has  existed  in  Com- 
munist  China  onto  which  most  of  the 
excess purchasing  power has flowed.  In- 
flationary  pressures,  as  a  result,  have 
generally  manifested  themselves  in  the 
form  of  price  increases  rather  than 
8 "Food  Supply  Improved,"  Far  Eastern  Eco- 
nomic Review, XL  (April  11,  1963),  55;  "Back  to 
Normal,"  Far  Eastern Economic Review, XLI  (Au- 
gust  15,  1963),  370;  and  "Press  Communique  of 
National  People's Congress," Peking Review, No. 49 
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through  the  accumulation  of  idle  cash 
balances.  The  actual  price level  (includ- 
ing  free-market  prices),  therefore,  has 
been  a meaningful  indicator  of  the  true 
degree  of  inflationary  pressures  (even 
though  these  pressures  have  not  been 
fully  reflected  in  the  official  indexes). 
Furthermore,  controlling  this  inflation- 
ary  pressure  has  had  a  considerable  ef- 
fect  on  the  efficiency  of  distribution  on 
the consumers' goods market. When con- 
trol  has  been  tight,  only  a  few  major 
commodities  have  been  rationed,  but, 
when  it  has  been  loose,  the  extent  of 
formal  and  de facto  rationing  has  ex- 
panded  rapidly. 
III.  CONTROLS OVER SOURCES OF 
PURCHASING  POWER 
The  Chinese  Communists  have  had 
two  basic  means  at  their  disposal  for 
maintaining  a  balance  between  aggre- 
gate  supply  and  demand  on  the  con- 
sumers' goods market. First, unlike their 
free-enterprise  counterparts,  they  had  a 
number  of  direct  controls  over  the 
sources of purchasing power entering the 
consumers' goods market which could be 
manipulated  in order to  maintain  a bal- 
ance.  Second,  they  had  several  devices 
that  could  be  used  to  fill  any  inflation- 
ary  gap  which  did  appear.  To  under- 
stand  how  the first of these  alternatives 
worked,  it  is  necessary  to  look  more 
closely into the exact nature of Mainland 
China's consumers' goods market. 
The  main  characteristic  of  the  con- 
sumers'  goods  market  was  that  it  was 
not one but  two distinct  markets,  one in 
urban  and  one  in  rural  areas.  Rural 
money  purchasing  power  was  derived 
primarily  from  the  sale  of  farm  and 
handicraft products, and between  70 and 
75 per cent  of it was spent  on industrial 
products.9 Urban money purchasing pow- 
er, on the other hand, mainly  came from 
the  wages  of  urban  employees  and  was 
expended on both agricultural and indus- 
trial products,  the former accounting  for 
approximately  70  per  cent  of  the  com- 
modity  outlay  of  the  average  worker.10 
Therefore, the stability  of the urban con- 
sumers' goods market depended primari- 
ly on the conditions of food supply in the 
cities,  whereas  that  of  the  rural market 
relied  instead  on  the  distribution  of  in- 
dustrial products  in the rural areas. 
The  extent  to which  activities  on one 
market influenced those on the other was 
limited.  State control of commerce, when 
combined  with  turnover  and  profits 
taxes,  made  it  possible  to  determine 
urban  sales  prices  of  major  agricultural 
products  independently  of  their  pur- 
chase  prices.  These  taxes  and  controls 
prevented  an  increase  in  inflationary 
pressure  in  urban  areas  from  auto- 
matically  spilling  over  onto  the  rural 
market.  The  only loopholes  were the ur- 
ban  free  markets  and  black  markets 
where peasants  sold their produce direct- 
ly.  Price  increases  on  these  markets, 
therefore, led to commensurate  increases 
in peasant  incomes  and purchasing pow- 
er.  Control  of  the  general  level  of  pur- 
chasing power and prices in one market, 
therefore,  was  not  necessarily  the  same 
as control in the other. 
The  two principal  sources of purchas- 
ing  power  over  which  the  authorities 
exercised  control  were  the  urban  wage 
bill and state  and co-operative  purchases 
of farm products.  Unlike  market  econo- 
mies where wages  are usually  influenced 
I This is derived from data in Table 2 and T'ung- 
chi Kung-tso ("Statistical  Work") data office, "Price 
Gaps between Industrial  Products  and Farm Prod- 
ucts:  Their  Changes  in  Post  Liberation  Years," 
T'ung-chi Kung-tso,  No.  17  (September  14,  1957), 
translated in Extracts from China Mainland  Maga- 
zines, No.  104, p. 23. 
10  "On  the  Question  of  Industrial  and  Agricul- 
tural Standards of Living,"  T'ung-chi Kung-tso, No. 
13 (July  14, 1957), p. 4. 364  DWIGHT  H.  PERKINS 
only through the manipulation  of general 
monetary  and  fiscal  controls  and  occa- 
sional  interference  in  the  process  of 
collective  bargaining,  control  in  China 
was  exercised directly  through  the  plan- 
ning  apparatus.  Both  the  number  of 
workers  whom  an  individual  enterprise 
could hire and the total  amount of wages 
that it could pay out were determined by 
the  central  planning  authorities  in  Pe- 
king. Theoretically  this gave  the regime 
all the control it needed over urban pur- 
chasing  power,  but,  in  fact,  these  con- 
trols  were  often  evaded.  The  situation 
was  least  under  control  following  po- 
litical  "rectification"  campaigns  such  as 
in  1956 and  1958 when financial controls 
were held in disrepute by the economical- 
ly  unsophisticated  party  cadres  (see 
Table  2).  This  led  to  a  situation  where 
state  firms  could  obtain  all  the  funds 
they  could possibly  use either by obtain- 
ing  loans  from  the  state  bank  or direct 
allocations  from  the  budget,  or  by  il- 
legally  taking  funds  designed  for  one 
purpose  and  transferring  them  for  use 
elsewhere.'" 
In  the  Soviet  Union  a similar evasion 
of  wage  controls  resulted  from  a  pro- 
vision  in the  regulations  providing  for a 
10 per cent  overexpenditure  above  that 
provided in the plan in any month follow- 
ing  on  one  when  no  such  outlay  was 
made.  This  possibility  of  evasion  was 
compounded by the fact that  wage over- 
expenditures  were allowed whenever  the 
output  plan was overfulfilled. These pro- 
visions  together  with  the  increasing 
shortage  of  industrial  labor  led  in  the 
1930's  to  severe  competition  between 
firms for the existing supply.  As a result, 
the  rate of labor turnover  was  over  100 
11 The  nature  of  Chinese  Communist  financial 
control  over industry  is  discussed at  length  in  my 
"Price  Formation  in  Communist  China"  (unpub- 
lished Ph.D. dissertation, HarvardUniversity,  1964), 
chaps. vi and vii. 
per  cent  during  most  of  the  first  five- 
year plan,  average wages increased near- 
ly  six times  and the  total  wage bill over 
fifteen  times  between  1928  and  1940, 
while real wages fell.12 
In China, on the other hand, there has 
never  been  anything  remotely  close  to 
a  labor  shortage.  Even  aside  from  pos- 
sibly  underemployed  labor  in  the  rural 
areas, there was always  some unemploy- 
ment  in the  cities  which  was  constantly 
being  replenished  by  rural emigration.13 
As a result, when given  the opportunity, 
industrial  firms did not  raise wages,  but 
hired far more unskilled labor than what 
had  been  authorized.  There  were  sub- 
stantial  unplanned  additions  to  the 
wage bill of this type  in  1953, 1956, and 
1958.14  In practice wage controls could be 
re-established  only  by  tightening  up the 
general availability  of funds  to  the indi- 
vidual  firms. The  ability  of the  state  in 
Communist  China  to  manipulate  the 
size of the wage bill, therefore, was not so 
much  greater  than  that  of  the  govern- 
ment  in free-enterprise  economies. 
In theory  the  Chinese authorities  also 
could adjust wage rates so as to offset any 
excessive  inflationary  pressure.  Actually 
wage rates could not be changed quickly 
and played  too important  a role in main- 
taining worker incentives  to be tampered 
with.  In  fact,  during  the  first few  years 
12F.  Holzman,  Soviet  Taxation  (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University  Press, 1955), pp. 37, 39- 
40. 
1  'Urban  unemployment  is  discussed  at  greater 
length  in  Ishikawa  Shigeru,  Chugoku  Ni  Okeru 
Shihon Chikuseki Kiko (Tokyo: Iwanami Bookstore, 
1950), pp. 44-47. 
14  T'ung-chi  Kung-tso  T'ung-hsun  ("Statistical 
Work Bulletin") data office, "The 1956 Labor Wage 
Situation,"  Ilsin-hua  Pan-yueh-k'an,  No.  10  (May 
25, 1957), p.  116; and Po I-po, "Draft  Plan for the 
Development  of the National  Economy"  (February 
3,  1958),  New  China  News  Agency,  February  13, 
1958,  translated  in  Current Background, No.  494, 
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following the Communist takeover of the 
Mainland  in 1949, when the inherited in- 
flation  of the  Kuomintang  had not  been 
completely  brought under control, work- 
ers were paid  in work points,  each work 
point  being  worth  a certain  quantity  of 
several  major  consumers'  goods.  Pay- 
ment in work points protected  the work- 
ers from  the  inflation  and  helped  main- 
tain their incentives  and loyalties,  but it 
also eliminated  any role for wage control 
TABLE  2 
SOURCES  OF  PURCHASING  POWER 
(Millions of Yuan) 
Total  Sales 
Total  Rural  of  Agricultural  State  and  Purchasing 
.  ~~~~~Purchasing  and  Subsidiary  Saead  Prhsn 
Purchasing  Total  Urban  Pur  andubs  Co-operative  Power  of 
Year  Pwr  WgBil  Power  Products  Pucaeof  Clctv 
Power  Wage  Bill 
(3 =4  +  other  (4=5  +  free- 
Pucaeof  Clctv 
(1=2+3+6)  rural  income)  market  Farm  Products  Units 
purchases) 
1950  .........  17,660  .  ............  9,500  8,000  780  ............ 
1951  .........  22,080  .............  .............  10,500  2,500  ............ 
1952  .........  27,600  6,700  16,500  12,970  5,630  ............ 
1953  ........  33,120  8,800  .  ......  ..  15,320  8,170  ............ 
1954  ........  37,670  9,610  .  .  .  17,360  12,070  ............ 
1955  .........  40,240  10,000  .  .  .....  17,800  ..................... 
1956  .........  46,500  13,600  24,500  18,400  13,300  7,440 
1-957  .........  47,000  15,250  25,000  20,280  15,620  6,400 
1958  .........  54,800  .  ............  30,000  22,760  19,720 
1959  .  .....................  .  .  ...........  .............  29,180  ............  ............ 
Sources:  Specific  sources  can  be found  in  D.  H.  Perkins,  "Price  Formation  in  Communist  China"  (unpublished  Ph.D.  disserta- 
tion,  Harvard  University,  1964),  p.  453. 
in bringing about  the inflation's  end. At 
the  time  elimination  of the  role of wage 
control  only  constituted  recognition  of 
the  obvious  fact  that  the  source  of  the 
inflation  was  the  imbalance  in  the  gov- 
ernment  budget  arising from the  inade- 
quacy of the existing  sources of revenue. 
The  wage-point  system  was  gradually 
abolished  once  the  inflation  had  been 
brought under control. 
There is also evidence  to suggest  that 
not  only  was  it  impossible  to  reduce 
wages  to  bring  about  a  balance  on  the 
urban consumers' goods market, but that 
the  principles  upon  which  wages  were 
determined  tended  to  make  them  rise 
faster than would have been the case on 
a free labor market. State  enterprises did 
not  feel  the  need  for as many  wage  dif- 
ferentials  as in fact  existed,  resulting  in 
promotions  not  being  made  where  indi- 
viduals  were  clearly  eligible  for  them."5 
The  proper  grading  of  personnel  was, 
therefore, made an element  of the major 
wage reform of 1956 with  the result that 
promotions  in  that  year  were  excessive 
from the point  of view  of price stability. 
The policy  of relating the increase in the 
over-all  average  rate  to  the  increase  in 
average  productivity  of  labor  also  gave 
wage  determination  an  upward  bias."6 
The  relevant  concept  for  wages  is  the 
marginal,  not  the  average,  productivity 
of labor. With  China's labor surplus it is 
doubtful  that  marginal  productivity  in- 
15  Speech by  Ma Wen-jui in Chung-hua Jen-min 
Kung-ho-kuo  Ti-i-chieh  Ch'uan-kuo Jen-min  Tai- 
piao Ta-hui Ti-san-tz'u Hui-i Hui-k'an, 1956, p. 733. 
16 Hsiao  Kung-ju,  "The  Principle  Underlying 
Wage  Increases,"  Hsueh-hsi,  No.  15  (August  3, 
1957),  translated  in Extracts from  China Mainland 
Magazines, No.  106, pp.  12-14. 366  DWIGHT  H.  PERKINS 
creased  at  all.  Average  productivity,  on 
the other hand, increased each year, if for 
no other reason than  that,  prior to  1958 
at  least,  the  average  laborer  had  more 
capital  to work with.  Finally,  the use of 
piece rates in setting wages often brought 
about  an  excessively  rapid rise in  labor 
payments  because  of difficulties entailed 
in  keeping  the  piece  rate  schedules  ad- 
justed  to  rapid improvements  in  indus- 
trial technology. 
From this  discussion  it  should  be ap- 
parent  that,  although  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists  had  the  legal  authority  to  ad- 
just  the wage  bill at will,  so as to  bring 
it in line with the supply of goods on the 
urban consumers' goods market, the best 
they  could  do  in  practice  was  to  slow 
down  its  rate  of  increase.  Even  this 
amount  of restraint  was impossible  dur- 
ing  periods  when  political  pressures 
made  tight  financial  control  an  an- 
athema.  The  need  to  expand  the  urban 
labor force and to keep worker incentives 
at  a  peak  so  as  to  maintain  the  rapid 
pace of industrial development  made any 
greater restraint  undesirable. 
The  regime's  hypothetical  authority 
to determine  the  amount  of funds  spent 
on the purchase of agricultural  and sub- 
sidiary  products  was  as  great  as  in  the 
case of wages, but in reality  this author- 
ity  was  even  more  circumscribed.  The 
need  for  rapidly  increasing  farm  pur- 
chases in order to feed the growing urban 
population,  to  export  to  the  Soviet  bloc 
and elsewhere to pay for imports of vital 
industrial  goods,  and  to  provide  con- 
sumers' goods industry  with  the bulk  of 
its raw materials"7  meant  that  purchases 
had  to be increased  as much  as peasant 
welfare and the need to maintain peasant 
17 Between  70 and 80 per cent of Chinese exports 
were agricultural or processed agricultural products 
and 70 per cent of the raw materials for consumers' 
goods industry were farm products. 
incentives  could  bear.  Nor  could  pur- 
chase prices be freely  adjusted  since the 
regime  used  relative  price  changes  to 
alter the emphasis placed on the different 
crops.  In  addition,  an  across-the-board 
price  fall  would  have  seriously  affected 
peasant  incentives  and  increased  their 
resistance to the marketing of their prod- 
uce.  As a result,  Communist  policy  was 
to  freeze  all  purchase  prices  subject  to 
state  control and raise them only when it 
was desirable to especially  encourage the 
production of a particular crop. As it was, 
purchase  price increases for the purpose 
of  increasing  production  alone  brought 
about  a 10 per cent increase in the over- 
all  purchase  price  index  between  1954 
and  1958.  One  should  not  be  left  with 
the impression,  however,  that  state  agri- 
cultural  purchase  policies  contributed 
nothing  to  controlling  inflation.  The  re- 
sale  of  these  commodities  on  domestic 
retail  markets  soaked  up  several  billion 
dollars  of  purchasing  power  more  than 
their  original purchase  had  created,  be- 
cause  turnover  and  profits  taxes  raised 
the retail prices well  above  the prices at 
which  the  same  goods  were  purchased 
without  any comparable increase in com- 
mercial  wages  or  costs.  Reduction  of 
state  farm purchases,  conversely,  caused 
a  net  increase  in  inflationary  pressure. 
Thus  during the  agricultural  crisis from 
1960 through the early part of  1962, the 
need to reduce state  purchases increased 
inflationary  pressure  by  a  considerable 
extent  and led to great increases in free- 
and black-market  prices. 
One possibility  which  might  have  in- 
troduced more flexibility into the control 
of  inflationary  pressures  arising  out  of 
fluctuations  in  farm  output  and  pur- 
chases would  have  been a compensatory 
agricultural tax. A progressive tax, how- 
ever, would  have  had the maximum  im- 
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gressive tax would have been an unbear- 
able hardship  and would  certainly  have 
tended  to  slow the development  of agri- 
culture.  In  actual  practice  the  regime 
went  to great lengths  to  insure that  the 
agricultural  tax  would  be  as  close  to  a 
fixed  lump-sum  tax  as  possible  so  that 
production  would  not  be  adversely  in- 
fluenced.18 
The  remaining  sources  of  purchasing 
power were far less significant  but  more 
easily  manipulated.  The  regime,  for  ex- 
ample, was able to control expenditure on 
consumers'  goods  by  collective  units. 
In  1957  the  authorities  reduced  these 
groups' purchasing power by  17 per cent 
for the stated  purpose of controlling  the 
inflationary  pressure  then  extant.19 Un- 
fortunately  not  very  much  is  known 
about  the  nature  of  this  source  of  pur- 
chasing  power.  It  apparently  includes 
funds of army units, welfare institutions, 
schools,  etc.  There  is  probably  some 
minimum level  below which expenditure 
in this area cannot  be reduced, and it  is 
possible  that  that  minimum  was  nearly 
reached in 1957. 
State  agricultural credit could also be 
fairly easily  manipulated  in order to  re- 
strain inflationary pressures. The bulk of 
agricultural  investment  came  from  the 
savings  of  co-operatives  and  communes 
and not from the outside.  State-supplied 
credit, therefore, could be cut back with- 
out seriously impairing rural investment 
programs.  The  level  of  such  credit  in 
1953 and  1954 was  too  small20 to  make 
cutbacks  of  any  great  use,  but  by  1957 
the  amounts  involved  were  substantial 
18 The tax was a percentage of the "normal yield" 
of the land. This "normal yield" was held constant 
for a period of years. 
19  Huang K'o, "How We May Settle the Disequi- 
librium between  Social Purchasing  Power  and  the 
Supply Volume of Goods in  1958," Chi-hua Ching- 
chi, No.  11 (November  9,  1957),  translated  in Ex- 
tractsfrom China Mainland Magazines, No. 119, p. 30. 
enough to make reductions in rural credit 
an  important  element  in  the  anti-infla- 
tionary  policies  of that  year.  Similar but 
probably even greater reductions in farm 
credit  and  direct  budget  allocations  to 
the  communes  apparently  were  under- 
taken  in 1960.21 
Adjustments  in  the  level  of  advance 
purchases  of  farm  crops,  a  form  of 
credit,  were  of  little  help  in  combating 
long  run inflationary  pressure  since  the 
government  had  to pay  for the  crops at 
the very latest  when it actually  received 
delivery;  but they  could be used as a de- 
vice  for  shifting  pressure  to  a  period 
when the state  was better  able to handle 
the  inflation  by  other  techniques.  Thus 
in  1957 these payments  were reduced by 
160 million  yuan,22  a move  which  prob- 
ably  shifted  some  pressure  off the  tight 
conditions  of  early  1957  and  onto  the 
latter  half  of  the  year  (when  most  pur- 
chases  were  actually  made),  by  which 
time  the  inflationary  pressure  had  sub- 
sided.  Except  for  1960 when  the  poten- 
tial  for  cutbacks  in  agricultural  credit 
and  allocations  was  so  great,  however, 
the  largest  reduction  in  purchasing 
power which  could be  culled  from these 
various  minor sources was less than  two 
billion yuan,  equivalent  to only  a  10 per 
cent  increase in farm purchase  prices or 
quotas or a 10-15 per cent increase in the 
wage bill. 
20 State-issued  agricultural  credit  was  666  and 
783 million yuan in 1953 and 1954, as compared to 
3,029  million yuan in  1956  (Young  Pei-hsin,  "The 
Road  to  Raising  the  Agricultural  Development 
Fund,"  Ching-chi  Yen-chiu,  No.  1  [January  17, 
1958], p. 32). 
21 Agricultural  credit  in  1958  and  1959,  which 
had gotten  somewhat out  of hand, totaled  9 billion 
yuan, and there were also large direct allocations of 
funds  to  the  communes  on a grant basis  (Perkins, 
op. cit., p. 142, nn. 55-56). 
22  T'ung-chi  Yen-chiu  ("Statistical  Research") 
data  office,  "The  Domestic  Market  Commodity 
Circulation Situation in 1957," T'ung-chi Yen-chiu, 
No.  4  (April 23,  1958), p.  24. 368  DWIGHT  H.  PERKINS 
The  situation  faced by  the authorities 
until  1960,  therefore,  was  one  of  sub- 
stantial  and  largely  unavoidable  in- 
creases  in  both  urban  and  rural money 
purchasing  power.  The  importance  of 
wages and farm purchase prices in main- 
taining  worker  and  peasant  incentives 
and determining  cropping patterns  tran- 
scended their role in controlling inflation. 
Compounding  the  difficulties  facing  the 
regime  was  the  erratic  way  in  which 
these  increases  occurred.  Periodic  wage 
reforms and changes  in farm purchasing 
regulations  and in the nature of the har- 
vest  made  predictions  of  trends  in pur- 
chasing power  for even  a year  ahead  of 
little  use.  Other  sources  of  purchasing 
power  such  as  that  of  collective  units, 
farm  credit,  and  the  like,  were  more 
readily  adjustable,  but  too  small  to 
offset  fluctuations  in  the  major  compo- 
nents. 
The  problem  for the  authorities,  as  a 
result, was how to insure that consumers' 
goods  production  not  only  kept  pace 
with  the  increase  in  purchasing  power 
but grew at more or less the same rate as 
well.  A rapidly  increasing  proportion  of 
consumers'  purchasing  power,  however, 
came from wages in the producers' goods 
sector  which  were  only  indirectly  re- 
lated  to  consumers'  goods  production. 
In  addition,  fluctuations  in  agricultural 
production were often not felt on the con- 
sumers'  goods  market  until  several 
months  or  a  year  later.  There  were, 
therefore, occasions when the supply  and 
demand  for consumers'  goods  were  cer- 
tain  to  be out  of balance.  The  resulting 
gap had to be filled by means other than 
direct  controls  over  the  sources  of  pur- 
chasing power. 
IV.  CLOSING THE INFLATIONARY  GAP 
To  retrieve  this  balance  the  authori- 
ties  had  either  to  find  some  means  of 
soaking up the excess purchasing power, 
or allow prices to rise at least temporari- 
ly.  Chinese Communist  resistance to the 
latter  alternative  was  great,  largely  on 
political  grounds.  The  Kuomintang  hy- 
perinflation  of  the  1940's  had  been  a 
major  factor  in  the  alienation  of  the 
people  and in the  demoralization  of  the 
regime itself. The Communists, of course, 
exploited  these  feelings  to  the  full  and 
later  pointed  with  pride  to  the  speed 
with  which  they  ended  the  rapid  price 
rise. They  oversold  this  point,  not  only 
to  the  general  populace  but,  more  im- 
portantly,  to the lower level party cadres 
as well. It was this latter group that was 
charged with the responsibility  for seeing 
to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  free 
markets and rural trade fairs. Because of 
their dislike of price increases, they  com- 
monly looked on their duties in this area 
as  the  curtailment  of  capitalist  tenden- 
cies, that  is, as the freezing of prices and 
the limiting of the scope of the market it- 
self. The penchant  for price-freezing and 
suspiciousness  of free markets in general 
carried  to  some  degree  even  up  to  the 
highest  level  of  authority.  Price  rises 
were seldom  consciously  allowed for the 
purpose  of bringing supply  and demand 
on  the  consumers'  goods  market  into 
balance  except  where  a  price  increase 
might  stimulate  the  increased  produc- 
tion  of  some  particularly  scarce  com- 
modity.23 Since the  turnover  and profits 
taxes  kept  price increases from affecting 
industrial  consumers'  goods  production, 
the  only  area where  such  price  changes 
could have  any influence was in agricul- 
ture. Therefore, the only prices that were 
23  One of several exceptions  to  this rule was the 
29 per cent increase in the price of woolens in 1957 
which was made to end queuing up on the market 
and  reduce domestic  demand so as  to  increase ex- 
ports-not  to stimulate production (Shanghai Chieh- 
fang  Ch'ien-hou Wu-chia Tzu-liao Hui-pien  [Shang- 
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adjusted with any degree of regularity at 
all were  those  of  crops  and  major  farm 
subsidiary products. 
It  was not  uncommon,  as a result,  for 
the  regime  to  be faced  with  the  task  of 
closing  an  inflationary  gap  by  some 
means other than allowing prices to rise. 
When  the  problem  was  minor  or  short 
run, the most  obvious  possibility  was to 
allow  commodity  stockpiles  to  take  up 
the  slack.  There  were  in  fact  consider- 
able fluctuations  in these  stocks,  but  on 
the  whole  the  stocks  were  much  too 
small  to  make  a  significant  difference. 
Chou En-lai  and others called for a sub- 
stantial  increase  in  these  reserves  so  as 
to  ease the  amount  of disruption  caused 
by  temporary  runs,24  but  the more com- 
mon  approach of those  in power was  to 
look  on substantial  reserves  as evidence 
of waste  and excess conservatism.  In ad- 
dition,  there was the prevailing  optimis- 
tic attitude  that production  on all fronts 
was bound  to  be much higher next  year 
or the year after; hence why make people 
tighten  their  belts  further  now?  Opti- 
mism  about  future  development  pre- 
vailed  in  1956  when  the  cotton-cloth 
ration  was  first  raised  and  then,  after 
cotton  output  had  not  come  up  to 
expectations  and  reserves  had  been  de- 
pleted,  had to be cut in half.25  The good 
harvest  of  1958 was  probably  also,  to  a 
large  degree,  consumed  immediately 
rather  than  set  aside  against  future 
disasters.26 
24  Chou En-lai, "Report on the Proposals for the 
Second Five-Year Plan for Development  of the Na- 
tional  Economy,"  Eighth  National  Congress of  the 
Communist Party of China, I,  277. 
25  Ministry  of  Commerce, "Report  on  the  1957 
Supply  of  Cotton  Cloth,"  Jen-min  Jih-pao,  April 
20, 1957, translated in Union Research  Institute, Vol. 
7, No.  17. 
26 This  statement  is  somewhat  speculative.  The 
lack of good data, particularly for agriculture in 1958 
and 1959, makes it necessary to rely on a few scat- 
tered refugee reports. 
The  most  important  measure  for 
closing  the  gap  at  least  over  the  long 
run was, of course, consumer taxes. As in 
the  Soviet  Union,  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant  of  these  taxes  were  those  that 
could  be  classified  under  the  general 
heading  of  sales  taxes.  In  the  case  of 
China  this  would  include  the  industrial 
and commercial taxes, which were similar 
to the Soviet  turnover tax and tax on the 
profits of state  enterprises.27 
The  importance  of  sales  and  profits 
taxes is readily apparent from the data in 
Table  3.  The  decision  to  put  so  much 
weight  on taxes  of this  type  was  a clear 
case  of development  considerations  tak- 
ing priority over price stability.  The high 
rate  of  investment,  the  emphasis  on 
producers' goods, and the lack of foreign 
aid in any great quantity  all meant  that 
the  tax  burden  on  the  consumer  had  to 
be extremely  heavy.  Considering the low 
level  of  per  capita  income  in  China,  it 
was  crucial  that  this  heavy  burden  not 
damp incentives  and thus  slow develop- 
ment any more than was absolutely neces- 
sary. Other taxes  might  make possible  a 
more flexible  short-run  response  to  fluc- 
tuations  in  inflationary  pressure,  but  a 
sales  tax  could  more  easily  disguise  the 
true size of this development  burden. 
Sales taxes, however, could not stop an 
initial  rise in prices, but  could only  pre- 
vent  excess  demand  from  increasing  re- 
tained  profits  and  eventually  spilling 
onto  the  labor  market,  thus  creating 
further  inflationary  pressures.  The  re- 
gime still had the problem of how to close 
short-run  inflationary  gaps  if  it  wanted 
27 The  difference  between  the  industrial  and 
commercial  taxes  and  the  profits  tax  (or revenue 
from state  enterprises)  was  that  the  former was  a 
fixed percentage of the price while the latter  was a 
flexible  percentage  designed  to  cover  whatever 
ground remained between  a commodity's  cost  plus 
other  taxes  and  its  price.  Both  taxes  fell  on  pro- 
ducers' as well as consumers' goods, but for different 
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to prevent  prices from rising in the  first 
place.  One  possibility  still  within  the 
realm of taxation  would have been to in- 
troduce an income tax. Unlike the Soviet 
Union,  Communist  China had no income 
tax at all, unless one includes the above- 
mentioned  agricultural  tax.  During  the 
first few years  of  Communist  rule there 
were substantial  levies  on the  income  of 
capitalists,  which  had  as  one  of  their 
goals  the  control  of  inflationary  pres- 
TABLE  3 
REVENUE  DATA  AND  THE  BURDEN  OF  TAXATION 
(Millions of Yuan) 
Total  Revenue 
(Excluding  Sales  and  Budget  Revenue  from  Burden  of  Per  Cent 
Year  Revenue  from  Profits  Taxe  Surplus  (+)  Credits  and  Money  Taxes  of  Money 
Credits  and  or  Deficit  (-)  Insurance  on  Consumers  Income 
Insurance) 
1950  .5340  3  260  -1,470  330  2,943  16.7 
1951.  9,160  7,980  -1,050  570  6,620  30.0 
1952  .17370  11,880  580  190  10,390  37.6 
1953  .21,270  15,920  -  220  490  12,753  38.5 
1954  ..........  24,440  18,930  -  190  1,790  15,370  40.8 
1955  .24,840  19,920  -2,080  2,360  14,266  35.5 
1956  .28,020  23,520  -2,560  720  15,748  33.9 
1957  .30,320  25,725  1,300  700  16,670  35.5 
1958  .41,060  36,200  100  800  21,315  38.9 
1959  .54,160  49,060  2,150  0  .............  ........... 
1960 budget  70,020  64,750  0  0  .............  ........... 
Sources:  Perkins,  op.  cit.,  pp.  417-19,  and  his  "Chinese  Communist  Taxation"  (in  preparation).  The  data  are  from  official 
Communist  sources  except  for  those  on  the  burden  of  taxation  which  are  estimates  by  the  author  and  the  total  revenue  figures 
for  1950 and  1951 which  are derived  from  percentage  increases  in  revenue  published  by  Chinese  official  sources. 
sures  resulting  from  the  Korean  War. 
The  main  reason  for  these  levies,  how- 
ever,  was  to  help  to  squeeze  the  capi- 
talists  out  of  existence,  a  task  largely 
completed by  1955 or 1956. A progressive 
tax  on  urban  wages  and  salaries  would 
have  been  administratively  feasible,  but 
the  authorities  undoubtedly  felt  that 
they  could accomplish  most  of the same 
results by  controlling  wages  and salaries 
directly  and with  a far smaller effect  on 
incentives.  Under  the  circumstances  the 
maintenance  of incentives  was  the  more 
important  goal, particularly  since the in- 
come  tax  would  have  had  to  have  been 
large or sharply progressive to have much 
of a stabilizing  effect. 
To  control  short-run  changes  in  in- 
flationary  pressure  on  the  urban  con- 
sumers'  goods  market,  therefore,  the 
regime had to rely on two other devices, 
namely  savings  deposits  and bond  sales. 
The two together  accounted  for over one 
billion yuan in purchasing power in each 
of the years 1954 through  1957 and 1959, 
and  two  billion  yuan  in  1958-about  10 
per  cent  of  the  total  wage  bill  in  each 
year. 
According  to  the  regulations,  savings 
deposits  and bond purchases  were to  be 
voluntary,  but  in  practice  Communist 
cadres  were  able  to  bring  considerable 
pressure to bear. Pressure,  however,  has 
not been the only technique  used. Inter- 
est is paid on deposits and the regime has 
even  resorted to holding raffles based on 
savings  deposits.  That  such efforts prob- 
ably  met  with  some,  although  limited, 
success  may  be  shown  by  the  fact  that 
current deposits  increased from  19.1 per 
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cent  in  1956  after  awards  for  such  de- 
posits were introduced,  although  the rise 
in  income  as  a result  of  the  1956 wage 
reform was  undoubtedly  also  a factor.28 
Nevertheless,  it  remains a fact  that  two 
of the largest increases in deposits,  those 
of  1956  and  from  April,  1959  to  July, 
1960,  took  place  after  the  issuance  of 
major state  council  directives  calling  on 
the  cadres  to  make  greater  efforts  to 
"educate"  the  masses  to  make  larger 
deposits.29 
TABLE  4 
URBAN  AND  RURAL BANK  DEPOSITS,  BOND  SALES, AND  PURCHASES  OF PRODUCERS'  GOODS 
(Millions of Yuan) 
Urban  Deposits  Sales  of 
D~ate  in  People's  Net  Annual  Bond  Sales  in  Rural  Rural  Producers' 
Bank  (End  Change  Urban  Areas  Deposits  Bond  Sales  Goods  to 
of  Year)  Agriculture 
1950 .........................  .............  242  .  ............  18  730 
1951)  t . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . .  .....  .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  ...  . . . . . . . . . ...  ..  .  .....  . . . . . . . . . . .  1 ,0 3  0 
1952  ............  740  .............  ...........  121  ...........  1,410 
1953  ............  1,090  350  ...........  251  ...........  1,920 
1954  ............  1,290  200  ...  362  140  2,500 
1955  ............  1,570  280  484  .............  135  2,820 
1956  ............  2,230  660  469  799  138  3,700 
1957  ............  2,790  560  433  1,800  217  3,260 
1958  ............  4,000  1,210  470  .  ............  320  6,680 
A  pril, 1959 ......  3,800  .............  ...........  .............  ...........  ............. 
1959  ............  5,123  1,023  0  .............  0  8,100 
1960 p  lan ..  . ....  .............  .............  ...........  .............  ...........  11 ,000 
July,  1960  .......  5,749  .............  ...........  .............  .  ...... 
Sources:  Perkins,  op. cit.,  p.  458. 
The  role of bond  sales was  somewhat 
different.  Their  original  function  had 
28  "A Survey of the Work of  Savings during the 
First Five Year Plan Period," Chung-kuo Chin-yun, 
(March 7, 1958), translated in Union Research  Insti- 
tite,  XI,  34. 
29 The  former was issued on November  5,  1955, 
and  was  based  on  recommendations  in  People's 
Bank of China, "Report on Progress in Developing 
People's Deposits," Chung-hua  Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo 
Fa-kuei  I1ui-pien,  No.  2  (August  30,  1955),  pp. 
548-51.  The  latter  was  issued  on  June  5,  1959 
(State Council, "Directive on Strengthening Leader- 
ship  over  Bank  Deposit  Work and  Positively  De- 
veloping  People's  Deposit  Work,"  Chung-hua Jen- 
min Kung-ho-kuo Fa-kutei Hui-pien,  No.  9  [June 5, 
1959], pp. 137-40). 
been  to  aid  in  soaking  up  the  surplus 
funds  of private  capitalists.  As industry 
and  commerce were socialized,  the  state 
had  to  turn  to  other  sources.  In  June, 
1958, the decision was made not to issue 
any  further national  economic  construc- 
tion  bonds  starting  in  1959  and  local 
authorities  were  empowered  to  issue  a 
limited  amount  of short-term  bonds at a 
reduced rate of interest.  The official rea- 
son  given  for  this  change  was  that  the 
decentralization  measures  of  1958 made 
it  necessary  to  increase  the  sources  of 
revenue  available  to  the  local  authori- 
ties,30 but  since  most  local  governments 
in  1959 apparently  decided  not  to  issue 
any  such bonds,  there probably  is a dif- 
ferent  explanation.  It  may  be  that  the 
element  of coercion in such bond sales to 
workers and peasants  was  so great  that 
it  took  on the nature  of a tax.  Bank  de- 
posits  could  at  least  be  redeemed  if the 
individual  was willing to go to the neces- 
30  Jen-min Jih-pao editorial,  "Why We're Going 
To  Issue  Local  Economic  Construction  Bonds," 
Hsin-hua  Pan-yueh-k'an,  No.  12  (June  25,  1958), 
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sary trouble. Hence  their disincentive  ef- 
fects  were undoubtedly  less. 
Control of short-run inflationary  pres- 
sures in the rural areas also depended  to 
some  extent  on  the  ability  of  cadres  to 
increase savings  deposits  and bond sales 
(see Table 4), but the relative poverty  of 
the  rural population  combined  with  the 
natural  rural suspicion  of such things  as 
banks  and  bonds  made  these  methods 
less useful than in the urban areas. More 
important  was  the  state's  ability  to  in- 
fluence  the  rate  of  savings  and  invest- 
ment  in the  rural areas through  its  con- 
trol  over  agricultural  co-operative  and 
commune  cadres.  It  was  through  these 
cadres that  most  of  the  funds  from  the 
sale of farm produce were channeled after 
1955. This  may  partly  explain  the  sub- 
stantial  increase in rural deposits  which 
took place after  1956, although  both  the 
size and nature of these  deposits  is diffi- 
cult  to  determine.  The  most  significant 
result  of  the  shift  in  control  over  funds 
to  the  cadres  was  the  enhanced  im- 
portance  of  the  supply  of  producers' 
goods  to  agriculture.  Since  few  of  these 
commodities  depended  on  agricultural 
raw materials, their production was com- 
paratively  easy to expand; and the party 
could see to it  that  there was no lack of 
sufficient  demand.  The  fact  that  the 
state  was  reducing  the  prices  of  these 
items fairly regularly also increased their 
potential  role as short run anti-inflation- 
ary  devices.  If  the  state  felt  that  rural 
purchasing  power  was  excessive  at  any 
particular  time  it  could  postpone  these 
price  reductions,  thus  soaking  up  addi- 
tional  purchasing  power.  Whether  or 
not  these prices were actually  controlled 
for this purpose is difficult to say.  What 
is  certain  is  that  the  greatly  increased 
delivery  of producers' goods  to  agricul- 
ture was  probably  the  main  factor  pre- 
venting  excessive  demand  for  consum- 
ers' goods  in  rural areas.  Even  the  in- 
crease in  rural deposits,  in fact,  did not 
affect  the  total  amount  of  purchasing 
power entering the market as much as it 
affected  the  shift  in  direction  of  that 
purchasing  power  from  consumers'  to 
producers' goods.81 
V.  SUMMARY AND  APPRAISAL 
The  Chinese Communists were able to 
maintain  a high degree of price stability 
in the face of rapidly increasing purchas- 
ing  power  and  somewhat  unstable  pro- 
duction  conditions,  particularly  in  agri- 
culture.  Although  some  of  this  stability 
was bought  at the  cost of formal and de 
facto  rationing,  the  lack  of  price  in- 
creases in the main represented a degree 
of  success  in preventing  the  appearance 
of  excess  demand  on  the  consumers' 
goods  market.  The  absence  of  inflation 
was brought  about  by  a combination  of 
efforts  designed  to  restrain  increases  in 
purchasing  power  and  to  fill  any  gaps 
which  did appear. 
The  regime's  emphasis  on  producers' 
goods industry  and a high rate of invest- 
ment  created  a  large  discrepancy  be- 
tween  total  purchasing  power  and  the 
value of available consumers' goods when 
priced  at  factor  cost.  This  long-run 
problem was solved primarily by  the in.- 
troduction  of  the  sales  tax-a  device 
chosen because  it  tended  to  obscure the 
true tax burden. Increases in the gap be- 
tween  purchasing  power  and  available 
goods  were also prevented  by  maintain- 
ing  as  tight  a  rein  as  possible  on  the 
growth  of  the  wage  bill  and  on  rises in 
agricultural  purchase  prices.  Incentive 
and other developmental  considerations, 
however,  made  some  increases  in wages 
and  prices  necessary.  In  addition,  the 
31  Deposits  in credit co-operatives were the main 
basis upon which loans were issued to peasants and 
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inflexibility  of  the  sales  tax  and  the  er- 
ratic rates of increase in purchasing pow- 
er meant that short-run inflationary gaps 
were continually  reappearing. For politi- 
cal  reasons,  these  gaps  could  not  be 
closed by temporary prices increases. As 
a result,  they  had  to  be filled by  make- 
shift  measures  such  as  bond  sales  and 
savings  deposit  drives. 
Two questions  may be raised concern- 
ing these developments.  First  of all, if it 
was in fact necessary to hold prices down 
as rigidly as was the  case in Communist 
China, did the  regime go about  control- 
ling  suppressed  inflationary  pressures in 
the  most  efficient manner?  Second,  was 
it  really  desirable  to  exercise  such  tight 
price control, or were the costs of the re- 
quired measures greater than the benefits 
derived? 
As to the first question, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion  that  the situation, 
except  perhaps  during  the  "great  leap 
forward," was  handled  about  as well  as 
it was reasonable to expect in light of the 
basic  goals  of  the  regime.  Given  the 
emphasis  on  rapid  industrialization  in 
the  producers'  goods  sector  and  the  er- 
ratic pace of development  likely  to occur 
in  any  ambitious  country  so  inexperi- 
enced  in planning  and  so  dependent  on 
agriculture, there were bound to be times 
when  the  amount  of  purchasing  power 
entering  the  consumers'  goods  market 
did not match the supply of commodities 
available.  The  only  real question,  there- 
fore,  is whether,  once  inflationary  pres- 
sure appeared, it was dealt with  quickly 
and  effectively.  On  the  negative  side 
there were few measures which  could be 
classified as automatic  stabilizers  as that 
term  is  presently  used  in  the  United 
States.  Only  an  agricultural  crisis,  be- 
cause it led to reductions in purchases of 
agricultural  products  and  eventually  in 
urban employment,  thus partially  offset- 
ting  inflationary  pressure  deriving  from 
the  drop  in  supply  of  farm  products, 
tended  to adjust purchasing power auto- 
matically  to meet  the smaller amount  of 
goods  available  on  the  market.  As  al- 
ready explained, however,  a reduction in 
purchases  still  had  a substantial  net  in- 
flationary  effect,  and  offsetting  reduc- 
tions in urban employment  were far from 
fully  automatic.  Individual  enterprises 
could and often  did keep on unnecessary 
workers long after their output  had been 
curtailed. The graduated income tax, the 
most  important  single  automatic  stabi- 
lizer  in  the  United  States,  would  have 
been  impossible  in  the  rural  areas  and 
would  have  had  too  great  an  effect  on 
incentives  in the cities.  Even  savings  de- 
posits  and  bond  sales  in  China  did not 
primarily respond to changes in the level 
of income. 
As a result, the central authorities  had 
to  rely  mainly  on timely  administrative 
action  in the form -of  direct adjustments 
of the sources of purchasing power or in- 
tensified savings deposit drives. With the 
possible  exception  of  savings  deposits, 
however,  these  various  measures  also 
played important  roles in promoting  eco- 
nomic  development,  roles which  usually 
had a higher priority than  the control of 
inflation  on  the  consumers'  goods  mar- 
ket. 
The  lack  of  automaticity  also  meant 
that  the  regime  had  to  recognize  the 
existence  of difficulties and then  to  take 
action.  In theory  there should have been 
no  difficulty  in  recognizing  inflationary 
pressure because  the  state  directly  con- 
trolled most of the relevant elements and 
determined  them  according to the needs 
of the national  plan, but  the crude state 
in  which  planning  still  operated  made 
recognition in reality a complicated  task. 
In  1953 and  1956 the  regime was  aware 
fairly promptly  of the  inflationary  pres- 374  DWIGHT  H.  PERKINS 
sure  since  price  increases  on  the  free 
market  and  runs  on  commodity  stores 
were difficult to ignore.  In late  1958 and 
early  1959 the  authorities  also  seem  to 
have realized that  some pressure existed, 
but  tight  price control  and  the  spirit  of 
the period eschewed frankness on the part 
of  lower-level  cadres  which  may  well 
have delayed  the regime's recognition  of 
the true situation. 
Once  the  existence  of  pressure  was 
recognized,  there  were  further  unavoid- 
able  lags  before  the  required  policies 
could  be  decided  and  acted  upon.  The 
Chinese  Communists  may  not  have  had 
to worry about what  a recalcitrant  Con- 
gress might  say, but  the measures avail- 
able  to  them  could  not  be  manipulated 
rapidly  at will without  seriously  impair- 
ing  production  and  development.  Even 
bank  deposits  could not  be  too  speedily 
pushed unless the regime were willing  to 
eliminate  all pretense  of voluntariness- 
in  which  case  they  might  as  well  have 
had an income tax. That the lag involved 
can  be  substantial  is  evidenced  by  the 
fact that the top leadership was uniform- 
ly  aware of the  inflationary  pressures of 
1956-57 by the time of the Eighth  Party 
Congress  in  September,  1956,  and  had 
already called for action to be taken; but 
the  pressure  did  not  subside  until  late 
1957, reaching a peak in early  1957-six 
months  after  the  meeting  of  the  Party 
Congress. This lag was partly  due to the 
fact  that  budget  cutbacks  had  to  await 
the  introduction  of  the  new  budget  if 
they  were  to  be  accomplished  system- 
atically,  and partly  due to  the  fact  that 
many  of  the  policies  affected  consumer 
purchasing  power  only  indirectly.2  The 
corresponding  lag  during  the  1958-59 
"great  leap  forward"  was,  if  anything, 
greater  than  in  1956-57  if  for no  other 
reason  than  that  the  greater  the  infla- 
tionary  gap  in the  first place  the  longer 
it is likely to take to eliminate it. One can 
argue  for  the  1958-59  case  that  the 
regime  had  the  power  to  control  the 
pressure on the consumers' market more 
efficiently  by  planning  as well  as it  was 
capable  in  the  first  place,  but  careful 
planning, whether for better or for worse, 
would have interfered with the basic idea 
of  the  "great  leap,"  which  was  to  de- 
centralize  virtually  all  authority  to  the 
lowest-level  industrial  and  agricultural 
units.3  If one accepts  the  Chinese Com- 
munists'  basic  goals,  therefore,  they 
were about  as efficient in handling  infla- 
tionary  pressure  as  was  possible  under 
the  circumstances.  Certainly  their  per- 
formance was more impressive than that 
of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  1930's,  al- 
though  part  of  the  credit  for this  must 
go  to  the  differences  between  the  two 
countries'  labor markets. 
As  for  the  second  question-  whether 
or not such rigid price control was desir- 
able-it  can be stated first that insofar as 
control  was  exercised  indirectly  rather 
than  by  administratively  freezing prices 
it  was  undoubtedly  a good  thing.  Infla- 
tionary  financing  of government  invest- 
ment  in  industry  would  have  made  no 
sense, since all the funds that could feasi- 
bly  be  taken  from the  population  could 
be secured from the turnover and profits 
taxes.  The people were probably  far less 
aware  of  the  true  extent  to  which  they 
32 E.g.,  cutbacks in investment  only affected the 
consumers'  goods  market  when  they  actually  re- 
sulted in the termination of employment  of workers 
employed on the various projects. Increases in bank 
deposits  may  have  often  merely  been  temporarily 
substituted  for  other  methods  of  holding  the  idle 
cash. 
33 This is discussed at greater length in my "Cen- 
tralization  versus  Decentralization  in  Mainland 
China and the  Soviet Union,"  Annals of the Ameri- 
can  Academy of Political  and Social  Science,  Sep- 
tember,  1963; and  my  "Centralization  and  Decen- 
tralization  in Mainland  China's Agriculture,  1949- 
1962," Quarterly Journal  of Economics, May,  1964. PRICE  STABILITY  AND  DEVELOPMENT  IN  MAINLAND  CHINA  375 
were paying  these  taxes,  and hence their 
incentives  were  affected  less  than  if  a 
substantial  part of the investment  funds 
had  been  provided  by  simply  printing 
the necessary amounts of money.  The ex- 
perience  with  the  hyperinflation  of  the 
1940's insured that  the  Chinese people's 
incentives  would be adversely  affected to 
a significant  degree at  the  first sign  of a 
recurrence of inflation.  Furthermore,  the 
nature  of  managerial  personnel  in  gov- 
ernment  enterprises  was  such  that  they 
tended  to  ignore  financial  considera- 
tions  and  often  planning  in  general  ex- 
cept  when  funds  were tight.4  In  theory 
it was, of course, possible to divorce tight 
financial  control  over  industry  from  in- 
flation  controls on the  consumers' goods 
market, but in practice,  as shown  above, 
the former was necessary in order for the 
latter  to  be  effective.  Of all  the  control 
measures available  to  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists,  only  the savings-deposit  drives 
and bond sales could conceivably  be said 
to  have  had  enough  of a negative  effect 
on  incentives  to  outweigh  their  useful- 
ness  in  controlling  inflation  or  in  ac- 
complishing  other  objectives.  The  au- 
thorities  themselves  apparently  came  to 
this conclusion about bond sales, whereas 
34 See n. 9. 
savings-deposit  drives  could  be  justified 
on  the  grounds  that  they  were the  only 
device  available,  except  for  allowing 
prices  to  rise, which  could  offset  tempo- 
rary imbalances  on the market. 
The  more  important  question,  how- 
ever, is whether it was desirable to adopt 
such  a policy  of  inflexible  opposition  to 
almost  all price increases even when this 
involved  direct  as well  as  indirect  price 
controls,  particularly  since  direct  con- 
trols  made  widespread  formal  and  de 
facto  rationing  unavoidable.  The  gains 
from  rigid  direct  price  control  were  in- 
creased  equity  in  the  distribution  of 
some major consumers' goods (only those 
which  were  formally  rationed)  and  the 
minimization  of  political  dissatisfaction 
arising from price increases in basic con- 
sumer items,  a not insignificant  factor in 
a country  where the bulk of the popula- 
tion  is  not  far  above  the  subsistence 
level.  On the  negative  side,  de facto  ra- 
tioning  in  the  form  of  long  queues  was 
both  inefficient  and  inequitable.  In  the 
latter  case,  therefore,  it  can  be  argued 
rigid price control  by  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists  was  excessive  even  in  the  light 
of  their  own  political  and  economic  ob- 
j  ectives. 